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“We as a Nation have long neglected the mentally ill . . .”1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Jails have come to replace psychiatric hospitals as repositories for people with mental
illness. In New York City, Rikers has become one of the nation’s largest inpatient mental health
centers, second only to the L.A. County Jail. A disproportionate number of these psychiatrically
disabled individuals end up in solitary confinement, doing “Bing time” 2 for rule infractions
precipitated by their illness. Resultantly, years of activism by the Jails Action Coalition and two
scathing reports commissioned by the New York City Board of Correction have finally spurred
efforts to reduce the use of solitary and improve mental health treatment on Rikers.
Queens and Bronx Counties have presented examples of two alternatives to traditional
incarceration of offenders afflicted with mental illness.

Bronx Mental Health Court 3 is a

community-involved initiative that seeks to address treatment needs while also reducing
recidivism.

Queens TASC Mental Health Diversion Program 4 manages both the Queens

Misdemeanor Mental Health Court and the Queens Felony Mental Health Court in order to divert
individuals with serious mental illness from current or potential incarceration.
While still not a national protocol, the practice of Mental Health Alternatives to
Incarceration (“MHATI”) is a form of justice that satisfies the standards devised in John Finnis’
Natural Law framework for morality. Specifically, Mental Health Alternatives to Incarceration
1

Remarks [of President John F. Kennedy] on Proposed Measures To Combat Mental Illness and Mental
Retardation, PUB. PAPERS 137, 138 (Feb. 5, 1963)
2
“Bing time” is jargon used to refer to punitive segregation imposed on prisoners for behavioral
infractions during their incarceration.
3
The Bronx Mental Health Court’s state goal is “to prevent mentally ill individuals from committing
crimes and to ensure their proper treatment.” See http://www.eacinc.org/bronx-tasc-mental-health-courtprogram (April 5, 2014, 5:13PM).
4
The Queens TASC Mental Health Diversion Program is provided by the EAC Network, which is
motivated as follows: “Our mission is to respond to human needs with programs and services that protect
children, promote healthy families and communities, help seniors and empower individuals to take
control of their lives.” See http://www.eacinc.org/about (April 5, 2014, 5:22PM).
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properly addresses Finnis’ goods of life, knowledge, sociability, and practical reasonableness,
and has been developed with the common good and justice in consideration. Accordingly,
because MHATI meets Finnis’ framework, in creation and in practice, for moral justifiability, it
stands as good law, in both the moral and legal senses.
A.

Department of Corrections: Rikers Island and Mental Health

There are three times as many people with serious mental illness in U.S. jails and prisons
than in state psychiatric hospitals—many of them incarcerated for low-level, nonviolent offenses
that result from an untreated psychiatric condition.5 People with mental illness do not fare well
in correctional facilities, where they are more likely to be victimized and housed in solitary
confinement.6 Historically, justice systems have been ill-equipped to address the needs of this
population due to a lack of adequate treatment services coupled with poor collaboration with
community-based health organizations.
The New York City Department Of Correction (DOC) imposes punitive segregation 7 on
pretrial detainees and sentenced prisoners for behavioral infractions during their incarceration.
They are imposed on adult and adolescent prisoners alike. Prisoners in punitive segregation are
locked inside specially designed single‐occupancy cells for 23 hours per day, with one hour of
recreation and access to daily showers in the housing unit. 8 Despite these strict measures, the
5

This provocative conclusion comes from a 2010 study conducted by the Treatment Advocacy Center
and National Sheriffs Association. This study focused on a comprehensive study of all 50 states to
determine the percentage of individuals with mental health problems who were incarcerated instead of
treated for their illness. See
http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/final_jails_v_hospitals_study.pdf (April 8,
2014, 7:25 PM).
6
See 7 NYCRR 6, §§ 320.2, 320.4, 320.5 (2014); cf generally, NYC.gov staff report regarding conditions
for mentally ill adolescents in the prison system.
http://www.nyc.gov/html/boc/downloads/pdf/reports/Three_Adolescents_BOC_staff_report.pdf (April 8,
2014, 8:38 PM) [hereinafter NYC.GOV STAFF REPORT].
7
“Punitive segregation” is also known as “solitary confinement,” “isolated confinement,” the “box,” or
the “bing.”
8
NYC.GOV STAFF REPORT, supra note 6 at iii, n.3.
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Minimum Standards at least require access to health care services and visits for prisoners in
punitive segregation. However before prisoners are permitted to leave their cells, they must be
handcuffed.9 Often times, incarcerated individuals with mental illness suffer from behavioral
infractions during their term in prison.
At Rikers Island, infracted prisoners are placed in one of several punitive segregation
units: two punitive segregation units at the RND Complex (the “RNDC”), a Central Punitive
Segregation Unit (“CPSU”) at the OB Correctional Center, a Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”)10
at RNDC, and the Mental Health Assessment Unit for Infracted Inmates (“MHAUII”)11 at the
GRV Center. 12 RHU And MHAUII are housing units for infracted prisoners with mental
illnesses who require more intensive mental health services.13
1.

Rikers Island: Mental Health Board and Standards

Spurred by a longstanding concern about inmate suicides, the Department of Corrections’
Board of Mental Health (the “Board”) developed rules and standards in order to promote the
delivery of appropriate correctional health and mental health services.14 The Board held public

9

7 NYCRR 10, § 1704 (2014); See also, NYC DOC Mental Health Standards,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/boc/downloads/pdf/mental_health_minimum_standards.pdf (April 6, 2014,
6:25 PM).
10
According to the DOC, the Restricted Housing Unit is a housing unit for infracted prisoners with
mental illness, and it features a self‐paced, multi‐phase behavioral modification program provided in a
group setting by mental health Staff from the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. Upon transfer to
RHU, prisoners start at level zero and are placed under lock‐in 23 hours per day. As they move up in
phases, they earn additional out‐of‐cell time. Prisoners who complete the program may see as much as a
50% reduction of their punitive segregation sentence. See NYC.GOV STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at ii.
11
Id. Prisoners in MHAUII are placed under lock‐in 23 hours per day and are allowed outside only for
limited mandated services and group and individual mental health treatment.
12
Id. All prisoners in CPSU, PS, MHAUII, and RHU are placed in single‐occupancy cells in these
specialized housing units for pre‐determined punitive segregation. The more serious the offense, the
greater the punitive segregation sentence. All adolescent prisoners are locked in 23 hours per day and are
allowed outside only for limited mandated services. Over time, however, prisoners in RHU may earn
more out‐of‐cell‐time.
13
NYC.GOV STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at ii.
14
“Promoting the delivery of appropriate correctional health and mental health services” is a critical part
of the Board’s mission. See BOC Mental Health Standards,
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hearings in the early 1980s to explore the quality and availability of mental health services
provided to prisoners. Thereafter, the Board worked collaboratively with the Departments of
Correction, Health, and Mental Health, and the Mayor’s Office of Operations, the Office of
Management and Budget and contract service providers to develop Mental Health Minimum
Standards for the City’s jails.
When the Mental Health Standards were implemented in 1985, New York City became
the first jurisdiction in the country to voluntarily require itself to provide appropriate mental
health staffing and other resources.15 The results were immediate and significant. In 1986, after

www.nyc.gov.html/boc/html/rules/mental_health.shtml (April 10, 2014 7:52 PM).
New York State Correction Law §2-04 Treatment
(a) Policy.
Adequate mental health care is to be provided to inmates in an environment which facilitates care and
treatment, provides for maximum observation, reduces the risk of suicide, and is minimally stressful.
Inmates under the care of mental health services, if in all other respects qualified and eligible shall be
entitled to the same rights and privileges as every other inmate.
(c) Programs
(6) Inmates identified as developmentally disabled shall be evaluated within seventy-two hours
and mental health services staff shall make a recommendation to the Department of Correction as
to whether such developmental disability makes it necessary for the inmate to be placed in special
housing or otherwise separated from the general inmate population:
(i) inmates who suffer from developmental disabilities shall be housed in areas sufficient
to ensure their safety;
(ii) if it is determined by mental health services that an inmate's developmental disability
makes it clinically contraindicated that the inmate be housed in a correctional facility,
then the Department of Correction shall immediately notify the court and a written notice
shall be filed in the inmate's court papers.
15

§2-08 Coordination.
(a) Policy.
The Departments of Correction and Health shall consult and coordinate their activities on a regular basis
in order to provide for the continued delivery of quality mental health care.
(b) Discipline.
(1) The Departments of Health and Correction shall develop written procedures to provide for mental
health services to be informed whenever an inmate in a special housing area for mental observation is
charged with an infraction, and to be permitted to participate in the infraction hearing and to review any
punitive measures to be taken.
(2) Any inmate to be placed in punitive segregation who has a history of mental or emotional disorders
shall be seen by mental health services staff before being moved to punitive segregation. All inmates in
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the first full year of the implementation of the Standards, there were three suicides—down from
eleven in 1985.

Key elements of the Mental Health Minimum Standards include mental health screening
of all incoming prisoners within 24 hours of arrival in DOC custody, training of correctional and
medical staff in the recognition of mental and emotional disorders, special housing areas for
those inmates with mental or emotional disorders in need of close supervision, 24-hour access to
mental health services personnel for emergency psychiatric care, and a prisoner observation aide
program that employs trained, carefully-selected inmates to help monitor those inmates identified
as potential suicide risks.

2.

Mental Health Alternatives: A Plan for Collaboration in NYC

In New York City, the proportion of inmates with mental health diagnoses continues to
rise. In 2013, 37% of DOC’s average daily population had a mental health diagnosis, up from
34% in 2012 and appreciably higher than the percentage a few years ago. 16 Concern about the
increasing prevalence and severity of mental illness in the city’s inmate population led to the
formation of the Mayor’s Steering Committee on Citywide Justice and Mental Health in 2012. 17
One of the Committee’s recommendations was to establish resource hubs in each of the five

punitive segregation shall be seen at least once each day by medical staff who shall make referrals to
mental health services where appropriate.
16
According to the Department of Corrections 2013 internal report, the 2013 statistic is significantly
higher than 2009, rising 10% from 27% to 37%, in 4 years time. See
http://www.nyc.gov/html/ops/downloads/pdf/mmr2013/doc.pdf. (April 9, 2014, 11:01 AM).
17
See NYC.GOV press release, NEWS FROM THE BLUE ROOM: MAYOR BLOOMBERG ANNOUNCES NEW
MENTAL HEALTH INITIATIVE, December 23, 2012
http://www.nyc.gov/portal/site/nycgov/menuitem.c0935b9a57bb4ef3daf2f1c701c789a0/index.jsp?pageID
=mayor_press_release&catID=1194&doc_name=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nyc.gov%2Fhtml%2Fom%2Fht
ml%2F2012b%2Fpr488-12.html&cc=unused1978&rc=1194&ndi=1 (April 13, 2014, 7:25 PM).
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boroughs to divert eligible defendants from jail to treatment in the community. The hope was to
establish a hub to operate in each of the five counties of the City within one year’s time.18
Concomitantly, DOC and the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (“DOHMH”)
entered into a joint collaboration to develop two new programs for mentally ill inmates. First,
they established the Clinical Alternative to Punitive Segregation (CAPS), for seriously mentally
ill inmates who incur infractions.19 Second, DOC and DOHMH piloted two restrictive housing
units for those with non-serious mental health diagnoses who incur infractions.20 As described
above, the RHU is both the place where the penalty of punitive segregation is imposed as well as
where clinical staff provides a three-phase behavioral program. Integral to an RHU is the
opportunity to earn progressively more out-of-cell time beginning the first week in the program
and an early (or conditional) discharge. The RHU is being expanded to serve all infracted nonseriously mentally ill inmates.21 The hope is to develop a system that appropriately addresses the
alternative needs of the growing population of mentally ill placed in incarceration.
The purpose of this Note is to diagram the historical development and present practice of
MHATI, and to discuss whether the practice is morally justifiable. Part II of this Note traces the
origins and illustrates the development of the practice to its present application and
interpretation.

Part III outlines and analyzes the basic elements of Finnis’ Natural Law

framework. Then, Part IV analyzes MHATI in the structural framework described in Part III.
Part V concludes this Note that MHATI is just law.

18

Id.
CAPS is a therapeutic program provided in a secure setting and not a punitive placement. The length of
time that a seriously mentally ill inmate remains in the unit is based upon their need for individualized
treatment provided by mental health professionals.
20
See NYC.GOV Mayor’s Management Report: Department of Corrections, Fiscal Year 2013,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/ops/downloads/pdf/mmr2013/doc.pdf (April 18, 2014, 1:15 PM).
21
Id.
19
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II.

HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF MHATI

This Part of this Note will examine the historical practice of MHATI and trace the
doctrine’s development to the present day’s primary application and interpretation. Dorothea L.
Dix, born April 4, 1802, was an American activist on behalf of the indigent mentally ill.
Through a vigorous campaign of lobbying state legislatures and U.S. Congress, she was
responsible for the creation of the first generation of mental asylums. 22 Notably during 1844,
Dorothea traveled to every county jail and almshouse throughout New Jersey in order to
determine how the mentally ill were afforded care, if at all. Relying on the findings from her
observations, with the support of Senator Joseph S. Dodd, Dorothea Dix founded the first insane
asylum with the passage of the New Jersey State Lunatic Asylum of 1845. 23 Dorothea Dix stood
for the proposition that the mentally ill deserved to be treated, not punished.
A.

Mental Health Recognition in the Law

At the time Dorothea was advocating on behalf of mentally ill persons incarcerated, there
was approximately 1 public psychiatric bed available for every 5,000 people in the population.24
According to the 1850 census, there was roughly 4,730 mentally insane individuals in the total
population of 23,261,000 at the time.

A century later, in the 1950s, just before the

deinstitutionalization of mental patients in the U.S., there was approximately 1 public psychiatric
bed for every 300 people in the population. 25 During the 100 years after Dorothea Dix’s

22

See Dix, Dorothea L (1843), Memorial to the Legislature of Massachussetts 1843, retrieved at
http://www.archive.org/stream/memorialtolegisl00dixd#page/n0/mode/1up
23
The passage of this law established the Trenton State Hospital. See The Asylum Project,
http://www.asylumprojects.org/index.php?title=Trenton_State_Hospital (April 18, 2014, 7:00 PM).
24
E. FULLER TORREY AND JUDY MILLER, THE INVISIBLE PLAGUE: THE RISE OF MENTAL ILLNESS FROM
1750 TO THE PRESENT, 218–222, App. C: Table 3 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press,
2002).
25
Id.
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advocacy, the problem of mentally ill persons in jails appeared to drastically reduce—individuals
were treated as patients, not criminals, and sent to mental hospitals.
With an eye to mental health incarceration—institutionalization v. criminalization—
British Psychiatrist and mathematician Lionel Penrose published a provoking paper in regards to
the relationship between psychiatric hospitals and prisons. Coined as the “balloon theory,”
Penrose postulated that the two populations were inversely correlated.

As such, as one

decreases, the other increases.26 Unbeknownst to Penrose, the United States at the beginning of
the 1940’s decided to embark on a new social experiment – deinstitutionalization—that would
give credence to his theory.
1.

Deinstitutionalization

One of the most well-intended—but poorly planned—social changes carried on in the
United States, deinstitutionalization refers to the emptying out of state mental hospitals.27 The
practice resulted from overcrowding and deterioration of mental hospitals and new medications
that significantly improved the symptoms of patients.28 Deinstitutionalization drew enthusiastic
support from fiscal conservatives interested in saving funds by closing state hospitals, as well as
civil rights advocates who believed that patients needed to be “liberated.”29
Notably, California was in the forefront of the deinstitutionalization movement. The
emptying of their mental hospitals began in 1950s, but once Ronald Reagan was in office as
then-governor in the 1960s, he vowed that all mental hospitals in the state would close

26

L. Penrose, MENTAL DISEASE AND CRIME: OUTLINE OF A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF EUROPEAN
STATISTICS, British Journal of Psychiatry 1938, 18:1–15.
27
See E. FULLER TORREY, NOWHERE TO GO: THE TRAGIC ODYSSEY OF THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL
(New York: Harper and Row, 1988), chapters 3 and 4
28
Id.
29
E.g. Ken Kesey, ONE FLEW OVER THE CUCKOOS NEST (1962)
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completely.30 Contemporaneous with his vow, California passed the controversial LantermanPetris-Short (LPS) Act in 1967, which virtually abolished involuntary hospitalization except in
extreme circumstances.31
2.

Deinstitutionalization and Imprisonment

By the 1970s, the social experiment of “deinstitutionalization” started to provide
credence to Penrose’s balloon theory. The emptying of state mental hospitals had resulted in a
marked increase in the number of mentally ill individuals in jails and prisons. In 1972 in
California, San Mateo County psychiatrist Marc Abramson published his findings that there was
a 46% increase in mentally ill prisoners in county jail and a 100% increase in the number of
mentally ill individuals adjudged to be incompetent to stand trial. To support his findings, he
quoted a state prison psychiatrist who stated, “we are literally drowning in patients. . .Many more
men are being sent to prison who have serious mental problems.”32
As the social experiment of deinstitutionalization spread across the country, countless
studies began to issue, bolstering the balloon theory notion. By the 1980s, multiple studies and
observations indicated that an increasing number of the discharged mental patients were ending
up in jails and prisons. According to a study of 500 mentally ill defendants, published by Gary
Whitmer, he concluded that the emptying of hospitals “forced a large number of patients into the
criminal justice system.33 Dr. Richard Lamb and colleagues corroborated this assertion through

30

See
http://www.salon.com/2013/09/29/ronald_reagans_shameful_legacy_violence_the_homeless_mental_illn
ess/ (April 18, 2014, 10:15 PM).
31
Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5000, et seq.
32
M. F. ABRAMSON, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF MENTALLY DISORDERED BEHAVIOR: POSSIBLE SIDEEFFECT OF A NEW MENTAL HEALTH LAW, Hospital and Community Psychiatry, 23:101–105 (1972).
33
G. E. WHITMER, FROM HOSPITALS TO JAILS: THE FATE OF CALIFORNIA’S DEINSTITUTIONALIZED
MENTALLY ILL, American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 50:65–75 (1980).

9

two published studies of the problem.34 By the 90s, there were countless studies conducted in
order to determine the pace of deinstitutionalization and its effect upon the criminal justice
system.35
By 2000, the tides began to shift again and activists demanded the government’s attention
to the problem. The American Psychiatric Association (the “APA”) estimated that about 20% of
prisoners were seriously mentally ill, with 5% actively psychotic at any given time. 36 In 2002,
the National Commission of Correctional Health Care issued a report to Congress in which it
estimated that 17.5 percent of inmates in state prisons had one of three major axis disorders,
including schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or major depression. 37 By 2003, based on their
interviews and visits to state and federal prisons, the Human Rights Watch corroborated the
APA’s data that 20% of inmates were seriously mentally ill. 38 In 2006, the Department of
Justice issued its own survey and determined that 24% of jail inmates and 15% of state prison

34

H. R. LAMB AND R. W. GRANT, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AN URBAN COUNTY JAIL, Archives of General
Psychiatry,39:17–22 (1982); H. R. LAMB AND R. W. GRANT, MENTALLY ILL WOMEN IN A COUNTY JAIL,
Archives of General Psychiatry, 40:363–368 (1983).
35
See e.g. L. A. TEPLIN, THE PREVALENCE OF SEVERE MENTAL DISORDER AMONG MALE URBAN JAIL
DETAINEES: COMPARISON WITH EPIDEMIOLOGIC CATCHMENT AREA PROGRAM, American Journal of
Public Health, 80:663–669 (1990); E. FULLER TORREY, JOAN STIEBER, JONATHAN EZEKIEL ET AL.,
CRIMINALIZING THE SERIOUSLY MENTALLY ILL: THE ABUSE OF JAILS AS MENTAL HOSPITALS, Public
Citizen’s Health Research Group and the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill (1992); J. R. BELCHER,
ARE JAILS REPLACING THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL?, Community
Mental Health Journal, 24:185–195 (1988); P. M. DITTON, MENTAL HEALTH AND TREATMENT OF
INMATES AND PROBATIONERS, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report (July 1999).
36
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES IN JAILS AND PRISONS, 2nd ed.,
Introduction, xix, (Washington, D.C., 2000).
37
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE, THE HEALTH STATUS OF SOON-TO-BERELEASED INMATES: A REPORT TO CONGRESS, vol. 1, p. 22 (March 2002). The cited data are based on B.
M. VEYSEY AND G.BICHLER-ROBERTSON, PREVALENCE ESTIMATES OF PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS IN
CORRECTIONAL SETTINGS, THE HEALTH STATUS OF SOON-TO-BE-RELEASED INMATES: A REPORT TO
CONGRESS, vol. 2 (April 2002), at
http://www.ncchc.org/pubs/pubs_stbr.vol2.html. (April 18, 2014, 11:05 PM)
38
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS
(Washington, D.C.: Human Rights Watch, 2003).
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inmates reported at least one symptom of a psychotic disorder.39 Thus, at the start of the new
millennia, there were numerous reports that all concluded that between 15% and 20% of inmates
had a serious mental disorder. A 2009 survey of mental illness among jail inmates revealed that
out of a total of 822 inmates (in five jails between New York and Maryland), a total of 16.6%
prisoners met the criteria consistent with higher rates of mental illness. 40 Remarkably, a survey
conducted by the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill 41 reported that 40% of mentally ill family
members had been in jail at some point in their lives.42 Based on the data, one can conclude that
in spite of the great work of advocates such as Dorothea Dix, jails and prisons have once again
become America’s mental hospitals.
B. Scholarship in the Law Related to Mental Health
Three traditions have dominated mental health law scholarship: “doctrinal constitutional
scholarship focusing on rights, therapeutic jurisprudence scholarship focusing on the therapeutic
implications of different laws, and theoretical scholarship focusing on philosophical issues
underpinning mental health law.” 43 This Note focuses primarily on the interaction between
mental illness and the law. This section addresses the doctrines created by the Supreme Court
and implemented by lower courts, federal and state legislation that enables or hinders the
participation of the mentally ill in society, new institutional forms and their effects on the
mentally ill, and underlying conceptual constructs about the nature of criminal punishment,

39

D. J. JAMES AND L. E. GLAZE, MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT, (Dec. 2006).
40
H. J. STEADMAN, F. C. OSHER, P. C. ROBBINS ET AL., PREVALENCE OF SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS
AMONG JAIL INMATES, Psychiatric Services, 60:761–765 (2009).
41
NAMI is an advocacy group for families of individuals with serious mental illnesses.
42
DONALD M. STEINWACHS, JUDITH D. KASPER, ELIZABETH A. SKINNER, FINAL REPORT: NAMI FAMILY
SURVEY (Arlington, Va.: National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, 1992).
43
ELYN R. SAKS, MENTAL HEALTH LAW: THREE SCHOLARLY TRADITIONS, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 295,
296 (2000).
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competency, and active participation in society. This Note recognizes the law’s impact on and
therapeutic potential for the mentally ill, a nontrivial portion of the general population.
1.

The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Mentally Ill Offenders

An estimated 26.2% of Americans aged eighteen years and older suffer from a
diagnosable mental disorder in a given year.44 The criminal justice system has become home to
many mentally ill individuals.45 Society has often failed to craft and interpret the law in ways
that are cognizant of mental illness and sympathetic to mentally ill individuals.46
The Sentencing Reform Act of 198447 (SRA) created the U.S. Sentencing Commission to
promulgate binding sentencing guidelines in response to a regime of indeterminate sentencing
characterized by broad judicial discretion over sentencing and the possibility of parole. 48 The Act
sought to create a transparent, certain, and proportionate sentencing system, free of “unwarranted
disparity” and able to “control crime through deterrence, incapacitation, and the rehabilitation of
offenders”49 by sharing power over sentencing policy and individual sentencing outcomes among
Congress, the federal courts, the Justice Department, and probation officers.
The heart of the Guidelines is a one-page table: the vertical axis is a forty-three point
scale of offense levels, the horizontal axis lists six categories of criminal history, and the body
provides the ranges of months of imprisonment for each combination of offense and criminal

44

RONALD C. KESSLER ET AL., PREVALENCE, SEVERITY, AND COMORBIDITY OF 12-MONTH DSM-IV
DISORDERS IN THE NATIONAL COMORBIDITY SURVEY REPLICATION, 62 ARCHIVES OF GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 617, 617 (2005).
45
See Fox Butterfield, Prisons Replace Hospitals for the Nation’s Mentally Ill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5,
1998, at A1.
46

See supra Part II.A.1

47

Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. II, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 28
U.S.C.)
48
See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989).
49
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING, at iv (2004),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/15_year/executive_summary_and_preface.pdf (April 8, 2014, 1:25PM).
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history.

50

A sentencing judge is meant to use the guidelines, policy statements, and

commentaries contained in the other 600-plus pages of the Guidelines Manual to identify the
relevant offense and history levels, and then refer to the table to identify the proper sentencing
range. 51

In certain circumstances the Guidelines allow for both upward and downward

departures from the sentence that would otherwise be recommended, even though in all cases a
sentence must be at or below the maximum sentence authorized by statute for the offense.
Few circumstances for departure involve the mental illness of an offender. Instead, the
Guidelines deal explicitly with mentally ill offenders in only a limited way. 52 Section 5H1.3 of
the Guidelines states, “[m]ental and emotional conditions are not ordinarily relevant in
determining whether a departure [from the Guideline range of sentences] is warranted, except as
provided in [the Guidelines sections governing grounds for departure].”53 Generally, that section
permits departure from the Guidelines if there is an aggravating or mitigating circumstance “not
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the
guidelines,” and if the departure advances the objectives set out in 18 U.S.C § 3553(a)(2), which
include elements of incapacitation, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. 54 Downward
departure is allowed when an offender suffers from a “significantly reduced mental capacity”
and neither violence in the offense nor the offender’s criminal history indicates a need to protect
the public.55

50

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A, at 394 (2012)
See id. § 1B1.1
52
Interestingly, the Guidelines deal more extensively with crimes against the mentally ill, providing for
heightened sentences for those committing crimes against victims deemed incompetent because of mental
illness. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(b)(10)(D) & cmt. n.20(B).
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id. § 5H1.3.
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Id. § 5K2.0(a)(1).
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the position that an offense involving violence or the threat of violence disqualifies an offender from a
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Moreover, the Guidelines were crafted to ensure that drug dependence, which is perhaps
most reasonably viewed as mental illness, would not act to mitigate sentences. 56 These factors
coincided with the rise of the idea that punishment should be measured by offenders’
dangerousness and not merely their culpability.57 A key implication of the Guidelines’ silence
on mental illness was that downward departures for the mentally ill, and hence the dangerous or
drug addicted among them, were rarely permitted.
Along with discouraging downward departure in cases of mental illness, prior to
Booker, 58 the Guidelines only allowed upward departure on the basis of mental illness under
section 5K2.0, for extraordinary circumstances not otherwise taken into account by the
Guidelines. 59 Courts were left to determine what manifestations of mental illness counted as
sufficiently extraordinary.
2.

Judicial Discretion from the Guidelines for Mental Health

In the 1990s, the attempted assassination threats against then-President Bush provides a
noteworthy example of sentencing an individual with mental illness.

The Ninth Circuit’s

decision in United States v. Hines60 suggested that lurid details and the specter of dangerousness

downward departure under this section. See EVA E. SUBOTNIK, Note, PAST VIOLENCE, FUTURE
DANGER?: RETHINKING DIMINISHED CAPACITY DEPARTURES UNDER FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES SECTION 5K2.13, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1340, 1340–43, 1354–57 (2002)
56
See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.4 (“Drug or alcohol dependence or
abuse is not a reason for a downward departure. Substance abuse is highly correlated to an increased
propensity to commit crime.”).
57
Paul H. Robinson, Commentary, PUNISHING DANGEROUSNESS: CLOAKING PREVENTIVE DETENTION AS
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1429–31 (2001).
58
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
59
Booker dealt a strong blow to a system of federal sentencing guidelines (that many viewed as unfair and
unsuccessful), granting judges more discretion. Permitting judges greater reliance on 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a), the federal sentencing regime post-Booker allows for prison sentences for violent mentally ill
offenders longer than those suggested by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. In particular, longer
sentences are not imposed because of the mental illness, but instead because judges impose sentences
beyond what the Guidelines recommend on some mentally ill offenders that they view as dangerous or in
need of treatment.
60
26 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1994)
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fueled by mental illness might, in combination, count as “extraordinary circumstances.” Roger
Hines was convicted of making threats against the President and being a felon in possession of a
firearm.61 In addition to traveling to Washington, D.C., apparently in hopes of killing President
George H.W. Bush, Hines kept a diary and wrote letters in which he claimed to have molested
and killed children.62 At sentencing, the court gave Hines an upward departure because of his
“extraordinarily dangerous mental state” and “significant likelihood that he [would] commit
additional serious crimes.” 63 Although upward departures based on a need for psychiatric
treatment are barred, the Ninth Circuit upheld the sentence arguing that the sentencing court had
departed not to treat Hines but because “Hines posed an ‘extraordinary danger’ to the community
because of his serious emotional and psychiatric disorders.’”64
Conversely, the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Moses65 opined that mental illness made
poor grounds for extraordinary departures. Defendant Moses, a paranoid schizophrenic who held
“strange violent fantasies” was “preoccupied with weapons” and had “overtly threatened the
killings of several people, and fantasized the slaughter of still more.” Despite being adjudicated
as “mental defective,” he was convicted for making false statements in order to purchase guns
and subsequently receiving them. The sentencing court subsequently sentenced him to six times
greater than the Guidelines recommended sentence for his offense and criminal history.
Accordingly, the sentencing court was motivated by the belief that Moses would cease taking his
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Id. at 1473
Id. at 1472. However investigators did not find evidence to corroborate this claim.
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Id. at 1473. The court justified this additional departure by reference both to Guidelines section 5K2.0
and to section 4A1.3, which allows departures where defendants’ criminal histories do not adequately
reflect their dangerousness. Hines, 26 F.3d at 1477. But cf. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.3
(2007) (enumerating the circumstances, which do not include mental illness, that may justify departures
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medications under which his condition had improved while he was in custody. 66 The Sixth
Circuit responded by vacating the sentence stating that, given the inclusion of section 5H1.3,
upward departures for circumstances not taken into account in the drafting of the Guidelines did
not apply to Moses. 67 Instead, civil commitment, rather than an upward departure, was the
appropriate mechanism for protecting the public.68
3.

Civil Commitments

The most obvious alternative to upward departures and variances for violent mentally ill
offenders is civil commitment following prison. In the ideal, at least, commitment keeps the
mentally ill confined and in treatment only so long as they display the symptoms that make them
dangerous to the public. Indeed, there is a federal commitment statute, 18 U.S.C. § 4246, that
provides for the commitment of a “person in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons whose
sentence is about to expire” who “is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect as a
result of which his release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or
serious damage to property of another.”69
Civil commitment following prison may not, however, be a perfect solution for dealing
with violent mentally ill offenders. Perhaps, to society — and to judges — a violent mentally ill
person who has served out a Guidelines sentence is not blameless. Perhaps once an individual is
deemed blameworthy, all that follows, even treatment and incapacitation for the public safety, is
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Id. at 1280; cf. United States v. Fonner, 920 F.2d 1330, 1334 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that “mental health
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sentence.” Moses, 106 F.3d at 1280.
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tarred by the initial retributive purpose. Evidence for this possibility can be found in the text of
§3553, which plainly allows incarceration, rather than commitment, in order to protect the public
and treat the offender.
Second, commitment is itself complicated.70 For instance, it is not clear that a violent
mentally ill offender would actually be committed and, if committed, receive treatment.
Commitment statutes are, with good reason, designed at least as much to avoid committing the
sane as to provide an alternative to prison for the dangerously insane. A commitment statute is
constitutionally sustainable if it combines “proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior”71
and “proof of dangerousness [coupled] with the proof of some additional factor, such as a
‘mental illness’ or ‘mental abnormality.’”72 Moreover, no one besides the director of the facility
in which the offender is held before the end of his sentence can petition to have the offender
committed.73 An offender who is still dangerous or might become dangerous immediately after
release might not be committed in light of these protections, perhaps most plausibly in a case
where an offender’s symptoms improve while being treated in custody but worsen when the
offender ceases treatment post-release. 74 In addition, offenders who are committed will not
always get treatment, removing some of whatever difference exists between commitment and
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This complication does not extend to whether commitment may immediately follow a prison sentence.
So long as the commitment is not intended to punish or deter the offender and normal requirements for
commitment are met, the commitment is civil and thus does not violate the Constitution’s prohibition on
double jeopardy. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 370 (1975). The Supreme Court willingly
posited that commitment statutes for the mentally ill are not intended to deter, since persons with a mental
abnormality are unlikely to be deterred by the threat of confinement. See id. at 361–63.
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Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002). In Hendricks, the Court suggested that a finding of mental
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imprisonment.75 Commitment without treatment may last indefinitely, a result far harsher than a
fixed prison term.
C. Rehabilitative v. Punitive: Mental Health Alternatives to Incarceration
In the last decade, diversionary programs known as mental health courts (“MHCs”) have
been created all over the country, different than the practices of incarceration or civil
commitments.76 These programs work at the local level to divert mentally ill chronic reoffenders
away from the traditional criminal justice system and into treatment.77 As MHCs become more
widespread and their effectiveness becomes broadly recognized, their sources of support have
grown. 78 Recently, the Department of Justice promoted (and funded) 79 MHCs as part of a
bipartisan effort jointly sponsored by the President and Congress to increase access to mental
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A state need not provide treatment to an individual who has been committed if that individual suffers
from an untreatable condition.
See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 367; SAUL J. FAERSTEIN, SEXUALLY DANGEROUS PREDATORS AND POSTPRISON COMMITMENT LAWS, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 895, 897 (1998)
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mental illness; (5) improve quality of life for people with mental illness; (6) improve coordination
between the mental health and criminal justice systems. See NY Courts mission. Available at
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health services. 80 No longer simply a few scattered programs, MHCs have now become a
national project providing mentally ill individuals a way out of repeated imprisonment.
Because of their unconventional nature, MHCs may also prove to be a window into the
evolution of America’s criminal justice system. Historically, the prevailing theory of punishment
has moved from retribution to rehabilitation to retribution and now back again.81 Since the mid1970s, retribution has been the norm. Along with it have come overflowing prisons and an
incarceration level higher than that of nearly all other developed countries.82 Recent popularity,
success, and widespread acceptance of MHCs and other problem-solving courts, 83 with their
focus on treatment and probation instead of incarceration and punishment, indicates that an
important step has been taken toward a more rehabilitation-focused justice system as a whole.
1.

Mental Health Courts: An Overview

America’s court system has long struggled with the question of how to provide justice for
mentally ill defendants. Are they to be treated like the rest of the population, tried, convicted, and
confined without regard to their mental status? Or does their mental illness place them in a
separate category?

According to Chief Judge Lippman, “we’ve learned that [mentally ill]

offenders do not do well in prison. . . . [T]heir illnesses just get worse. And what happens when
they are released without having received effective treatment? They get recycled right back into

In 2000, Congress enacted the America’s Law Enforcement and Mental Health Project (ALEMHP)
Act, Pub. L. No. 106-515, 114 Stat. 2399 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3796ii to 3796ii-7 (2000)). The
ALEMHP Act would have created up to 100 new MHCs by 2004. However, funding was not
immediately appropriated.
81
See supra, Part II (a).
82
JUSTICE KENNEDY COMM’N, AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES 4 (2004) [hereinafter KENNEDY COMM’N], available at http://www.abanet.org/
media/kencomm/rep121a.pdf (April 19, 2014, 4:34 PM)
83
Problem-solving courts are criminal judicial proceedings that attempt to address defendants’ actions at
a causal level by imposing remedial discipline rather than retributive punishment. Such courts include
drug courts, domestic violence courts, MHCs, and others. See BRUCE WINICK & DAVID WEXLER,
INTRODUCTION TO JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY 3–5 (Winick & Wexler eds., 2003).
80

19

the system. Everyone loses.” 84 Mentally ill defendants whose offenses are linked to their
conditions are unlikely to receive treatment in prison, and very likely to reoffend quickly after
their sentences are over. 85 This situation presents a challenge to judges, prosecutors, and
legislators alike: if there is a treatable mental condition at the root of a series of recidivist
offenses, does the criminal justice system have the right, or perhaps the responsibility, to attempt
to intervene at that root level?
In the last ten years, MHCs have developed in order to take on this challenge. Combining
aspects of adversarial courts and other diversionary programs under the supervision of criminal
court judges, MHCs actively seek out repeat offenders whose offenses are linked to mental
illness and divert such individuals from the normal criminal process. Arresting officers, defense
counsel, the judge or even the prosecution flagged these individuals for the program so that cases
are adjudicated in an MHC. The hope is that this will provide granting offenders a way out of
the cycle of recidivism. When identified as possible candidates for an MHC, defendants are
given psychiatric evaluations and, if diagnosed with a mental illness that contributed to their
offense, are offered “long-term treatment as an alternative to incarceration.”86
In general, for example in the Bronx, defendants are referred to the program, screened for
eligibility, enter the court through a formal plea process, are matched with community-based
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Jonathan Lippman, Achieving Better Outcomes for Litigants in the New York State Courts, 34
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 813, 826 (2007). Judge Lippman is an advocate for MHCs.
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treatment, and then participate in court monitoring, case management, and treatment services.87
The duration of participation can vary based on charge and mental illness characteristics. There
is a minimum six-month treatment mandate for misdemeanor crimes, while treatment mandates
for felony crimes typically last 18 to 24 months. The mandated length of treatment begins upon
entry into a treatment program, rather than the plea date. Since it can often take a significant
amount of time to find an appropriate and available treatment program, participants may be
under court supervision for longer periods of time than the treatment mandate.
In order to exit out of the program, stakeholders look for measurable outcomes to
determine program success. For example in Brooklyn MHC, program success is defined by
multiple factors such as cessation of drug abuse, no re-arrests, and adherence to the treatment
mandates. 88 To graduate, participants must pass through the courts four stages successfully:
adjustment, engagement, progress and preparing to graduate, while remaining arrest-free.
Graduation generally results in dismissal of charges for misdemeanors and non-violent, first time
offenders. Predicate offenders and individuals who commit first-time violent felonies will have
their charges reduced to a misdemeanor plea and receive a period of probation. Individuals who
fail will be sentenced to a term of imprisonment in jail or prison, in accordance with their plea
agreement.89
2.

Mental Health Courts: A Fundamental Shift in the Criminal Justice System

The recent growth of MHCs is illustrative of a broader trend — or, perhaps, the reversal
of a trend. In 2003, Justice Kennedy spoke to the American Bar Association urging legal
practitioners not to forget that the criminal justice system is more than “the process for

87

SHELLI ROSSMAN, ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE INTERVENTIONS FOR OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS:
EVALUATION OF THE MENTAL HEALTH COURTS IN BRONX AND BROOKLYN, NEW YORK
88
Id.
89
Id.

21

determining guilt or innocence.”90 Instead, “[a]s a profession, and as a people, [lawyers] should
know what happens after the prisoner is taken away.”91 He continued that, though “[p]revention
and incapacitation are often legitimate goals,” it is nevertheless important “to bridge the gap
between proper skepticism about rehabilitation on the one hand and the improper refusal to
acknowledge that the more than two million inmates in the United States are human beings
whose minds and spirits we must try to reach.”92
III.

JOHN FINNIS’ APPROACH TO JUSTIFIED MORAL JUDGMENTS

The purpose of this Part is to introduce and outline John Finnis’ Natural Law approach to
making justified moral judgments. A professor of law for both the University of Notre Dame
School of Law and Oxford University, Finnis teaches courses in jurisprudence as well as SocialPolitical-Legal theories of Aquinas and Shakespeare. 93

Although Finnis has numerous

publications, Natural Law & Natural Rights serves as the primary source of Finnis’ natural law
framework.94
By first contending for, and labeling, the existence of seven irreducible, fundamental, and
basic goods or values, Finnis develops his theory of “the good” in Natural Law & Natural
Rights. 95

Of the seven goods, Finnis especially elaborates on knowledge and practical

reasonableness—with nine requirements of its own—since those goods are illustrative to
understanding the fundamental and absolute nature of all seven goods. 96 Next, Finnis explains
the importance of community, communities, and the common good in conjunction with making
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moral judgments, followed by discussions regarding justice, rights, authority, law, obligation,
and unjust laws.97
A. Finnis’ Seven Irreducible Basic Goods
Drawing upon the philosophies of Aristotle and Aquinas, Finnis offers a list of basic
goods98 for human beings. They are: life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, sociability or
friendship, practical reasonableness and religion.99 These basic goods are self-evidently ‘good’
and cannot be deduced from other premises. He appeals to anthropology to make a strong case
for the universality of these basic goods. “All human societies, show a concern for the value of
human life. . .and in none is the killing of other human beings permitted without some fairly
definite justifications.” Though not referring to self-evidence at this point, instead, Finnis finds
support for his ‘self-evident’ principle by alluding to Aquinas’ theory that basic human goods are
indemonstrabilia, not capable of being demonstrated. Thus “the good of knowledge cannot be
demonstrated, but equally it needs no demonstration.” These goods are meant for all and they
can be realized by all people who take into consideration what is right and wrong to do.
All of the seven basic goods are equally fundamental.

They are incommensurable

meaning thereby one cannot measure one against another. Accordingly, Finnis states that people
should pursue all the goods and should not ignore any one of them. This does not preclude an
individual to give emphasis to one good over another, however none of these goods should be
excluded. By using the word “good,” Finnis does not only refer to a specific objective or goal,
but also refers to a general accomplishment of the same goods realizable through indefinite
forms. According to Finnis, each of the basic goods are intrinsic goods, meaning they are worth

97

See generally id. at 134–367.
See generally id. at 59–127.
99
Id. at 81–99.
98

23

having for their own ends, and not as a means for obtaining other types of goods. These basic
goods are not 'morally good' or 'moral values', but objective goods, the things that make the life
worthwhile; qualities which render activities and forms of life desirable. On this understanding
they may be understood as a set of conditions which enable the members of a community to
attain for themselves reasonable objectives and make people's personal plans and projects of life
a possibility. It is these goods that form the basis for Finnis's account of practical reason and
thus for his theory of justice, rights and law. In sum, humans should pursue all seven goods with
every endeavor and avoid evil or values contrary to such goods.
1. Knowledge
The first good that Finnis derives is knowledge.100 Finnis derives knowledge from the
general human inclination to be curious, ask questions, and attempt to acquire information.
Accordingly, Finnis concludes that knowledge is self-evidently an objective good.
Finnis appeals to self-evidence because human beings cannot describe a precise,
extraneous source (absent a deity) of proof that knowledge is an absolute good.101 While initially
questionable, Finnis illustrates the validity of self-evidence for the purposes of deriving
knowledge as one of the seven basic goods. Citing examples, Finnis explains that principles of
sound empirical judgment—including standard logic and reason—are self-evident and, without
acceptance of such principles, any objection is self-defeating or self-refuting.

Since any

assertion or reflection on any topic necessarily seeks to provide or capture knowledge, the good
inherent in that process is self-evident.

100
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Like the other goods, knowledge is an intrinsic good because it is valuable for its own
sake and is not simply a means of obtaining other goods. 102 Knowledge is accomplished—
realized or ascertained—distinguishable from beliefs, since it cannot be false in the way a belief
can be false. Accordingly, knowledge of the truth is always worth pursuing and possessing for
its own sake. The pursuit of knowledge makes intelligible any particular instance of human
activity and commitment involved in such pursuit. As being well-informed and clear-headed is
good in itself, ignorance is to be avoided, since it is contrary to knowledge of the truth.
2. Practical Reasonableness
The second, and perhaps most important good for the purposes of making moral
judgments, is practical reasonableness.103 Finnis defines this good as the ability “to bring one’s
own intelligence to bear effectively (in practical reasoning that issues in action) on the problems
of choosing one’s actions and lifestyle and shaping one’s own character.”104 This good has two
aspects: an internal element and an external element. Internally, one must strive to control his
emotions and dispositions, and bring them into harmony, creating a legitimate peace of mind.
Externally, one must strive to make his actions, that have effects on the outside world, genuine
realizations of his own freely ordered determinations.
Understanding practical reasonableness is crucial to Finnis’ entire moral judgment
framework because practical reasonableness is the good by which humans choose appropriate
courses of action.105 As a product of free will, freedom, and personal autonomy, human beings
have, and make, choices between commitments that concentrate upon one value over another.
Practical reasonableness is the good that guides decision-making, selection of particular acts, and

102

Id.
Id. at 88–89, 100–34.
104
Id. at 88.
105
Id. at 100–03.
103

25

which value to concentrate on at a particular moment. Thus, practical reasonableness is not only
a good in itself, it is the means of acting in a way that pursues and nourishes the other six
fundamental goods.
To clarify how one is to act practically reasonable, Finnis delineates nine requirements.106
These are: (1) a coherent plan for life; (2) no arbitrary preferences amongst values; (3) no
arbitrary preferences amongst persons; (4) detachment; (5) commitment; (6) reasonably limiting
relevance of consequences; (7) respect for every basic value in every act; (8) consideration of the
common good; and (9) following one’s conscience. The following paragraphs will elaborate on
each requirement in turn.
The first requirement for a practically reasonable judgment is that it corresponds with a
coherent plan of life.107 Finnis, citing what John Rawls would call “a rational plan of life,” states
that commitments made to any particular value must be effective. By this, Finnis charges that
one is not acting practically reasonable if he lives merely from moment to moment. Further, it is
irrational to devote one’s attention exclusively to specific projects that can be carried out only for
his own accomplishment. Rather, humans should see their lives in one whole with particular
activities rationally fitting as episodes in a single series. Accordingly this is a liberal theory; it
allows each of us to formulate different plans having focus on some objective goods more than
others.

Finnis does not want that we must have the perfect life with the perfect balance to

participate in all the basic goods. In other words, he does not want each of us to be the ideal
college applicant with all the right extra-curricular activities. All that a coherent life plan insists
upon is that we should remain open to the value of all the basic goods regardless of what the
focus of our national plan of life is.
106
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The second requirement of practical reasonableness is that humans should not have
arbitrary preferences amongst values.108 Simply stated, one cannot fail to consider, arbitrarily
discontinue or exaggerate, or disregard any of the seven irreducible goods. “There must be no
leaving out account, or arbitrary discounting or exaggeration of any of the basic human goods.”
According to Finnis, any coherent plan of life will involve concentration on some objective
goods at the expense of others, but what is required is that such a plan should be rational. One
must choose a coherent plan of life on the basis of one’s capacities, circumstances, and even
one’s tastes. But it would be unreasonable if it either gives too much value to instrumental goods
like wealth, opportunity, reputation or pleasure or is based on some devaluation of a basic human
good. Related to a coherent plan of life, any commitment will involve some degree of
concentration on one or some of the basic goods at the expense of other goods. Such a sacrifice
or concentration is justifiable as long as it is not arbitrary—the concentration or sacrifice of any
good must be in accordance with the coherent plan of life. Thus, based on circumstances, tastes,
preferences, and capability, particular goods will rise or fall above others in priority, but this is
permissible when the prioritization is not arbitrary.
The third requirement of practical reasonableness is that one must not have arbitrary
preferences amongst persons.109 Each human, as a free individual, is constantly in pursuit of the
good in some form or another. Although one human’s survival, self-determination, and allaround flourishing may not be of any concern to another human being, another human must still
regard that one human impartially among all human subjects whom partake in pursuit of the
seven fundamental goods. This requirement of practical reasonableness follows along the lines
of the golden rule “do unto others as they unto you.” The basic goods are capable of being
108
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pursued and enjoyed by any human being and they are equally good when enjoyed by some other
person as when enjoyed by myself. The essence of the third requirement is that one should not
have obsessive concern with another’s survival, knowledge, creativity, or pursuit of any of the
other basic goods. This does not necessarily mean that one cannot favor one’s own self-interest.
Similar to the second requirement, favoring of any human being over another must not be
arbitrary. Accordingly, in correspondence with a coherent plan of life, one can effectively
choose some people over others with whom to share their pursuit of the good based on any
particular set of circumstances, capacities, and legitimate preferences.
As the fourth and fifth requirements of practical reasonableness, namely detachment and
commitment relate to each other and also to the requirement of a coherent plan for life, Finnis
puts them together. The fourth basic requirement of practical reasonableness is detachment.110
Finnis explains that, for a coherent plan of life, one must have a certain detachment from all the
specific and limited projects he undertakes. Essentially, Finnis requires that each person have
perspective on what any particular action or decision has within the scope of his entire life. For
instance, if a particular project fails, one would likely not consider one’s life drained of all
meaning. Such an overreaction would irrationally devalue and treat as meaningless the basic
human good of authentic and reasonable self-determination. Accordingly, no person should be
fanatical about any particular decision.
Similar to detachment, the fifth requirement of practical reasonableness is commitment.111
Considered the opposite, or the balance, to detachment, commitment requires that one be
reasonably bound to any particular undertaking. Finnis requires fidelity to obligations. So, if a
decision, project, action, or pursuit is not bearing as much fruit as anticipated, such pursuit
110
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should not be abandoned lightly. Rather, within the scope of a coherent life plan, one should
stay with a particular course of action, but carefully never breach the threshold of obsession or
fanaticism (thereby violating detachment). Together, with detachment, commitment provides a
metric by which humans must remain with decisions in a flexible, but balanced, manner.
The sixth requirement for making practically reasonable judgments is that one reasonably
and efficiently give limited relevance to consequences [efficiency within reason].112 One should
be efficient in his action in trying to carry out the basic goods. So, in determining whether a
choice is reasonable, particular circumstances surrounding that choice may warrant the weighing
of particular costs and benefits.113
Generally speaking, cost-benefit analysis should usually not hold dispositive weight for a
moral judgment.114 However, such analysis may be appropriate where currency or a marketable
value is determinable.

Where a moral judgment revolves around choosing the most cost-

effective project, then it is practically reasonable to use a cost-benefit analysis for that scenario.
However, if a particular problem does not involve the use of currency, but rather a particular
fundamental good, then weighing the consequences through a cost-benefit analysis would be
inappropriate. For example, the traditional moral dilemma of sacrificing one life to save multiple
lives would not be an appropriate scenario for a cost-benefit analysis under Finnis’ framework.
Unless a non-moral denominator can serve as currency for a particular decision, comparing the
consequences as a means of making a moral judgment is not practically reasonable. Overall,
Finnis contends that Consequentialistic calculus has a place in practically reasonable
determinations, but only in a limited sphere.
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The seventh requirement of practical reasonableness is that one must respect every basic
value in every act.115 It essentially states that one should not choose to do an act which, of itself,
does nothing but block, damage, or impede the pursuit of any one or more of the basic goods.
This requirement epitomises the maxim: the end does not justify the means.

Finnis

acknowledges that one might act in contradiction of a basic good, but only because perceived
consequences outweigh the destructive effect on that basic good. For example, it may seem
justified to kill a crazed man wielding an axe if it appears he is attempting to murder innocent
bystanders. Although it would appear the consequences of such an act would be the safety of
others, Finnis contends that weighing the basic good of life for some over others is always
necessarily arbitrary and delusive. Finnis simply remarks that the ends cannot justify the means
in this context. Rather, Finnis might propose that a non-lethal form of self-defense be exercised,
which preserves all of the seven irreducible goods, if possible. Similarly, walking away from
family obligations would not be justified, as it directly damages the basic good of sociability. To
the contrary, if a scholar works on a Sunday to meet an important deadline, he is not guilty of a
violation of the seventh requirement; damage caused to the family life, which is the basic good
of sociability, is not the result of a direct decision to harm his family. There is no doubt that his
overtime decision indirectly damages the basic good of sociability, but it also enhances the good
of knowledge.
Finnis differentiates between directly diminishing basic goods (never practically
reasonable) and indirectly diminishing basic goods (may be practically reasonable).116 If one is
to act intelligently, one must reasonably choose to act in a manner that favors particular goods
over other goods, and such a decision will indirectly interfere with the realization of another
115
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value. Finnis explains that opportunity costs exist where one concentrates on some goods at the
expense of others. Similar to the requirement of a coherent plan of life, one may act practically
reasonable even though some goods face an indirect detriment from a particular course of action.
To clarify when an act indirectly attacks a good, as opposed to directly, Finnis describes
four conditions of the potential “double effect”—meaning the promotion of one good at the
expense of another.117 The first is that the act itself must not be an intrinsic wrong. Secondly,
the intention of the actor must be “upright”—in good faith promotion of a good. Thirdly, the
consequences of the act must be realized simultaneously. Lastly, the harm must be proportionate
to the good achieved. When these four conditions are met, an indirect harm to a good is
justifiable.
The eighth requirement for practically reasonable judgments is that one’s conduct favor
the common good. 118 This serves as the basis for our “common moral responsibilities,”
obligations, and duties. It assumes that participating in the common good is to realize what
would enhance the participation in goods of both one’s neighbor and of himself. In short, Finnis
requires that one must foster the common good of one’s community or communities in every
action. This requirement, and how it relates to MHATI, will be more thoroughly discussed
below.
The ninth and final requirement of practical reasonableness is that one must follow one’s
conscience.119 Finnis states the one should only do what one thinks he or she should, or ought to
do, and similarly, that one should avoid doing what one judges ought not to be done. Simply,
one must act in accordance with one’s conscience. One should not do what one judges or thinks
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or ‘feels’ all in all should not be done. In other words, practical reasonableness requires that one
acts in accordance with one's conscience.
Overall, taking all nine requirements of practical reasonableness together, the end product
of obliging by these requirements is morality.120 Although not every requirement may have a
direct role in every moral judgment, some moral judgments do require consideration of all of the
nine requirements discussed above. Essentially, although the nine requirements do not comprise
a moral calculus, the harmony of all the requirements, along with the recognition of all the basic
goods, serves as the formula for making moral judgments. Thus, if one is practical reasonable,
which is a good in itself, one can be confident that his or her judgments are morally justifiable.
3. Remaining Values: Life, Play, Aesthetic Experience, Sociability, and Religion
Finnis’ five remaining goods are: (1) life; (2) play; (3) aesthetic experience; (4)
sociability or friendship; and (5) religion. 121 Combined with the knowledge and practical
reasonableness, these seven goods comprise the exhaustive list of goods, with each being equally
fundamental.
The third good is the basic value of life.122 Here, the term “life” represents every aspect
of vitality that puts a human being in a good position to achieve self-determination. Life is not
simply self-preservation, but includes health, freedom from pain, and prevention of
malfunctioning of organs. Finnis also remarks that procreation, not simply the urge to copulate,
is a form of protecting the basic good of life. Simply stated, Finnis states that there are an
indefinite number of forms that recognition of this good could take, from emergency surgery to
establishment of traffic safety laws.
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The fourth good is play.123 Finnis defines play as the act of “engaging in performances
which have no point beyond the performance itself, enjoyed for its own sake.” 124 Like the
recognition or pursuit of any other good, pursuit of play is limitless. Performance of play may be
“solitary or social, intellectual or physical, strenuous or relaxed, highly structured or relatively
informal, conventional or ad hoc in its pattern . . .”125 It is readily apparent that play has and is
its own value amongst the seven goods.
The fifth good is aesthetic experience.126 This good is closely related to play because
beauty is not an indispensable element of play. But, unlike play, aesthetic experience does not
require activity from the observer. Rather, what is “beautiful” is valued for its own sake for the
experience and appreciation on behalf of the observer. Often, the valued experience is found in
the creation or active appreciation of something with significant and satisfying properties.
The sixth good is sociability, meaning friendship.127 In its weakest form, humans can
recognize minimal friendship in the forms of peace, harmony, and safe community. Of course,
in its strongest form, friendship may include full friendship and even love. Friendship involves
acting for the sake of another friend’s purposes and well-being. Accordingly, friendship is
relevant when Finnis discusses community and the common good, which is analyzed below.
The seventh, and final irreducible good, is religion. 128 By using the term “religion,”
Finnis is not referring to any particular worship. Rather, Finnis uses religion as a blanket term
describing humans’ tendency to reflect on the basic values and the role such values and orders
play on a universal/theological transcendental scope.
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Essentially, this good refers to the

understanding and search for origins and the “universal order-of-things” that brings meaning to
human existence and activity.
B. The Common Good, Justice, Rights, Authority, Law, Obligation, and Unjust Laws
After discussing the seven fundamental goods, Finnis uses the rest of Natural Law &
Natural Rights to explain how his seven irreducible goods are strongly tied to the common good,
justice, rights, authority, law, and obligations.
Appreciation for communities, community, and the common good is crucial in Finnis’
framework for moral judgments.
reasonableness,
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As part of the nine requirements of practical

the common good must be considered when deriving one’s moral

responsibilities. Accordingly, moral judgments necessarily involve the exploration of one’s
rational self-interest—relationship to one’s own well-being—and that of the well-being of others.
There is a requirement that the “basic values be always respected not only in one’s own but
other’s participation in them.”131 Assessing the network of relationships under which everyone
lives is indispensable for all subsequent assessments of justice, rights, authority, laws, and
obligations.
Finnis describes community as having several forms, with true friendship being the most
intense form.132 There are different types of relationships aside from true friendship, such as
business communities and play communities. Whether it be biological, through understanding,
through culture, or by order of action, whatever the uniting principle is, communities are some
form of friendship. As such, from the vantage point of friendship, one can realize that one’s own
good and the good of one’s friend are equal.
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More broadly speaking, Finnis also contends that there is a “complete community,”
which refers to achievement of the good for all individuals in the context of the international
community.133 The common good refers, in every form of association, to the coordination of life
plans of individuals. Accordingly, the same principles of practical reasonableness that govern
individual morality amongst personal friends are the same that govern relationships amongst
nations. Thus, the focal meaning of politics and law, in light of the nations that create them,
concerns the complete community.
Related to community and the common good, Finnis discusses justice. 134 Justice is
defined as an important element of practical reasonableness because humans seek to realize and
respect goods in common with each other, not merely for their own individual purposes.
Accordingly, justice has three necessary and sufficient requirements: (1) Other Directedness—
meaning it involves relationships; (2) Duty; and (3) Equality. Bearing these three requirements
in mind, in consideration of their relationship with the community, justice requires that all
persons undertake their duty to respect the rights and goods of others. Further, each person is to
be treated proportionally equally, not arithmetically.
Distributive justice and commutative justice are terms necessary to Finnis’ theory of
justice.135 Distributive justice is the allocation or distribution of limited goods for the sake of the
common good.

Further, Finnis outlines five criteria for distributive justice: (1) need; (2)

function; (3) capacity; (4) merit of contribution; and (5) creation of avoidable risks.

In

consideration of these criteria, the common good requires the exercise of authority and discretion
to properly appropriate limited resources.

Conversely, commutative justice refers to the

resolution of disputes amongst individuals. So, a judge, by presiding over a dispute, owes a duty
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to apply commutative justice for finding a just and equitable solution. The laws that govern the
fair process and procedures of the legal system would bear the principles of Finnis’ commutative
justice.
Moving beyond justice, Finnis next elaborates on his perspective on rights.136 “Natural
rights” are used synonymously with the term “human rights.” Where the source of particular
rights, especially legal rights, does not always cleanly fit into any particular requirement of
practical reasonableness, Finnis still extrapolated “absolute human rights.” 137 These absolute
human rights stem from the seventh requirement of practical reasonableness, namely that “it is
always unreasonable to choose directly against any basic value.”138 Further, the seven basic
values are not merely abstractions, rather, they are aspects of the real well-being of humans.
Accordingly, respect for these goods creates exceptionless claim-rights (as opposed to liberty,
power, or immunity rights) for every person. The obvious examples of these rights include the
right to life, information, reproductive rights, and the right to be heard. Since these rights are
directly tied to practical reasonableness, they are absolute.
As a necessary foundation for his philosophical framework, Finnis shifts his discussion to
authority,139 which is necessary to achieve the common good. Authority addresses two problems
in any community: the coordination problem and recalcitrance. Instead of acting in random,
possibly harmful manners, the coordination problem justifies authority simply to have all
members within a group acting in a coordinated effort. Where unanimous agreement could also
serve as a solution to the coordination problem, reality dictates that unanimity is simply too rare,
or perhaps impossible, to govern. Coordination problems are never fully solved once-and-for-
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all, but authority can effectively reconcile conflicts over the individual’s exercises of what are
otherwise basic goods and rights.
Finnis also differentiates practical judgments from descriptive or empirical judgments,
which are not really judgments at all.140 A practical judgment, labeled S1, bears the form of
assertion of what is good reason. S1 assertions are valid assertions of authority because the
speaker treats the authority of the assertion universally, to both the listeners and himself. S2 are
the descriptive judgments and S3, the empirical judgments, the less noble assertions, in Finnis’
eyes. An S2 assertion states what a particular group considers a good reason. Similarly, an S3
assertion states what is good reason from another’s S1 perspective. By their nature, these
descriptive and empirical judgments do not have a binding effect on the speaker because they do
not speak from a position of what actually is reason, but instead from what other perspectives
consider reason. Accordingly, the speaker, and anyone else, is in a position to object to an S 2 or
S3 assertion’s binding effect by removing themselves from the particular perspective. Thus the
primary type of statement about authority must be an S1 statement, because citizens must share in
rulership, possess knowledge and capacity for ruling and being ruled, and always contribute to
the common good. Only under an S1 assertion of authority is the common good properly
considered.
Next Finnis addresses how law fits into his natural law framework.141 The purpose of
law is to provide “comprehensive and supreme direction for human behavior” in a particular
community.142 It is necessary for ensuring the common good. Additionally, law’s purpose is to
grant validity to all other normative arrangements affecting members of the community, enabling
a mechanism for the legitimate recognition of resolutions to coordination problems. To be
140
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effective, Finnis contends that law relies on justice, which may need to be secured by force to
otherwise avoid recalcitrance. Failure to comply with legal stipulations must be reconciled, as is
common in legal systems, because such failures can be rooted in obstinate self-centeredness,
careless indifference, or in deliberate opposition, all which in some way violate requirements of
practical reasonableness.
In describing how a legal system ought to be, Finnis classifies five features of legal
order.143 First, law brings specificity, clarity, and predictability into all human interactions by
way of rules and institutions. Secondly, any legal rule is valid in force or in existence, and must
be treated as so, until it is formally repealed. Thirdly, rules of law regulate the conditions under
which a private individual can modify the incidence or application of the rules—how the law
applies to him through institutions and actions, such as contracts. Fourthly, the law gives reasons
for acting in the present based on what had happened in the past. It gives now sufficiently and
exclusionary reason for acting in a way then provided for. More simply stated, legal systems
bear some form of stare decisis. Fifth, and lastly, all legal systems will have gaps but they still
fundamentally establish the source of authority in any given system to decide open questions. In
most systems, this would be the judiciary courts.
In closing his discussion about law, Finnis defines the “Rule of Law.”144 A requirement
of justice, the Rule of Law provides a basis for criticism of rules and the underlying legal system
itself. Legal systems exemplify the Rule of Law so that rules are promulgated, clear, coherent,
sufficiently stable to allow people the capacity to be guided by the substance of the rules,
applicable to particular and limited situations, and prospective (as opposed to retroactive). If
those who have authority are accountable for their compliance with the rules and actually
143
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administer the law consistently, then a legal system appropriately meets the Rule of Law. Lastly,
Finnis states that other desiderata,145 such as the independence and openness of the judiciary, are
necessary for a legal system to properly and justifiably operate within the Rule of Law. Overall,
the purpose of these requirements for legal systems is to secure subjects of authority the dignity
of self-direction and freedom from manipulation. A legal system must conform to the Rule of
Law in order to be just.
Apart from the Rule of Law, Finnis distinguishes Natural Law from legal systems.146
Legal systems bear parts of natural law and positive law. Natural law is the set of principles of
practical reasonableness in ordering human life and human community—essentially this is
synonymous with natural rights, intrinsic morality, and natural reason. Positive law is the law
that exists simply because it is indoctrinated, written, or established.

All laws have some

elements of positive law, but not all laws within a legal system will reflect natural law principles.
Since there is a difference between law, in the human practice, and natural law, Finnis
defines what a practically reasonable person’s obligations are with respect to laws, rights, and
morality. 147 Obligation signifies things one has a duty to do; what one must do. As is a
requirement of practical reasonableness, obligation is a demand upon one’s conscience. To
explain obligation, Finnis explores forms of rational necessity as the derivative requirements of
practical reasonableness.

First, there are promissory obligations, or obligations undertaken

through promises and understanding amongst individuals and in the community. Humans foster
the common good when they meet their promissory obligations—i.e., keeping their word—
because rights created through a promise have reciprocal duties. When all duties are fulfilled or
completed, trust is established, which allows a community to function.
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Individuals in a

community depend on one another, so with trust comes the confidence of well-being for the
entire community.
Invariant obligations, such as legal obligations, are separate and distinct from promissory
obligations are.148 Many legal obligations are variable in content and incidence, but the directive
force of the law or obligation cannot be reduced or bargained from. Finnis contends that one has
a moral obligation, in terms of practical reasonableness, to obey the law because it is necessary
for the common good, one must always be law abiding, and as law it is obligatory. This
obligation is presumptive, but ultimately defeasible.
In the event that a law is an unjust law, a citizen is bound by the obligation and the
penalty nonetheless, even though, as Finnis argues the law is not morally binding.149 Unjust laws
can be categorized into four groups: laws intended exclusively for the benefit of the ruler and his
or her compatriots; laws which are beyond the authority of the law maker; laws which violate the
Rule of Law (made outside of the proper procedure); and unfair laws that do not conform to
distributive nor commutative justice. In ultimately distinguishing moral obligation and legal
obligation, Finnis remarks that for the sake of the common good, one’s moral obligation to obey
the law, at minimum, is to act in way that avoids weakening a righteous Rule of Law and the
legal system as a whole.
C. Summary of Finnis’ Natural Law Framework
Overall, in Natural Law & Natural Rights, Finnis develops his theory of “the good” by
labeling the existence of seven irreducible, fundamental, and basic goods or values: (1)
knowledge; (2) practical reasonableness; (3) life; (4) play; (5) aesthetic experience; (6)
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friendship; and (7) religion.150 Of the seven goods, Finnis elaborates on knowledge and practical
reasonableness since those goods are illustrative to understanding the fundamental and absolute
nature of all seven goods. 151

Further, Finnis explains the importance of community,

communities, and the common good in conjunction with practical reasonableness since
consideration of the common good is a sub-requirement of all practically reasonable decisions.
Next, Finnis elaborates how justice, rights, authority, law, obligation, and unjust laws fit into the
framework of practical reasonableness. 152 From this framework, Finnis creates a pervasively
useful tool to making sound, legitimate, and justified moral judgments.
IV.

CONSIDERATION OF FINNIS’ NATURAL LAW FRAMEWORK APPLIED TO MHATI

This Part will apply the relevant aspects of Finnis’ natural law framework to MHATI.
Ultimately, after applying Finnis’ requirements of practical reasonableness, and considering all
of Finnis’ seven fundamental goods, MHATI is a just practice, in both creation and its
application. MHATI is a practically reasonable judicial tool that justifiably outfits communities
with the discretion to divert mentally ill offenders to therapeutic measures as opposed to
incarceration. Element by element, this Part will discuss how MHATI meets each requirement of
practical reasonableness and how it was created in line with Finnis’ fundamental goods.
A. Goods Involved in a MHATI Determination
Not every good will be implicated in a discussion about the moral justifiability of
MHATI. Of Finnis’ seven intrinsic goods, the following are affected in a meaningful way: (1)
life; (2) knowledge; (3) sociability; and (4) practical reasonableness. While the remaining goods
could arguably be served or disserved one way or another, such a discussion could distract the
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analysis with a discussion about indirect effects and hypothetical predictions of future results.
As Finnis clarifies, such a discussion is not appropriate for a morality determination.
1. MHATI promotes the Basic Good of Life
MHATI at its essence promotes the basic good of life.153 As described above,
diversionary practices in the criminal justice system enables and restores mentally ill defendants’
self-determination. Through therapeutic treatments, life skill training, and post-rehabilitation reentry programs, MHATI, at its core, respects the vitality of human life; of human dignity. As
described above, MHCs promote remedial discipline rather than retributive punishment.154
As Chief Judge Lipman cautioned, mentally ill defendants whose offenses are linked to
their conditions are unlikely to receive treatment in prison, and very likely to reoffend quickly
after their sentences are over.155 Incarcerated mentally ill offenders receive long bouts of solitary
confinement—“Bing” time—. lock-ins, and segregation. MHATI, however, promotes treatment
of the illness and encourages inclusion—group therapy—in order to address the cause of the
problem.156 Additionally, the participants receive life-skill training, aside from treatment plans,
in order to prepare them for re-entry into the community while also treating their condition.
MHATI values the individual behind the offense, as opposed to regard the offense instead of the
person. Whereas MHATI seeks therapeutic measures, mentally ill incarcerated individuals are
evaluated as the threats they may pose and thus subject to further punitive measures while
imprisoned for things such as behavioral infractions.157 Subjected to hours of isolation, mentally
ill offenders in prison are treated more like animals rather than human beings.
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As described by the establishment of the DOC Board of Health’s Minimum Standards,
the need to address the unique needs of the mentally was warranted because of patient
suicides.158 At its core, the proper treatment of mentally ill offenders, as MHATI advocates,
mandates a respect for life. Thus, by encouraging treatment—not punishment—out of respect
for human dignity, MHATI promotes the basic good of life.
2. MHATI Serves the Basic Good of Knowledge
MHATI serves the basic good of knowledge because the underlying purpose of the
practice seeks informed decision making about mentally ill offenders.

Preliminarily, for

diversion, the system needs to determine whether an individual has a mental illness in order to
decide how to best address the needs of the individual as well as the community.159 In the most
basic sense, diversion seeks facts and information in order to cultivate the most meaningful
diversion program. Once charged with offensive conduct, defendants are screened with a battery
of psychological tests to determine the presence of mental illness. Next, if referred into MHATI,
the diversion program gathers facts about the offensive conduct and the community resources to
determine the most appropriate treatment plan. As part of the program, defendants rely on the
community provided resources to learn social skills and work readiness training. 160 Since
MHATI, at its core, works with participants to help them understand and change criminal
behaviors caused by their mental illness,161 the practice directly serves this basic human good of
knowledge.
For instance, once courts learn that an individual has an axis-related disorder such as
bipolar, he can be referred into an MHC. Upon a conditional plea of guilt for admission into the
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program, medical personnel provide therapy sessions as well as medicine, while community
workers teach participants social skills. Finally, after work readiness training, once a mentally ill
offender is considered qualified for the program exit, he can enter into the community again,
relying upon his newly-acquired skills to succeed. In sum, a participant exits out of the program
because he has demonstrated successful skills necessary to be a functioning member of the
community.
Overall, MHATI best serves the good of knowledge.

In purpose and in practice,

application of the doctrine leads to finding the most truth about an offender with mental illness,
as well as the relevant needs of the affected community, and therefore knowledge is pursued
from the onset of the act.
3. MHATI Promotes Sociability
The next good that MHATI promotes is sociability.

Here, MHATI does not serve

friendship necessarily between particular individuals, but rather serves to promote the
community and common good. The most applicable element of the practice that appeals to
community is the use of community resources to change criminal behavior and thinking. For
example, participants are required to attend socialization re-training as part of the diversionary
program. 162

Furthermore, group therapy sessions tend to be a common practice in MHATI.

Essentially learning new skills and succeeding through the diversion is premised upon the basic
of sociability.
The dissent might argue that removing an individual from the general population and
subjecting him to individualized treatment serves to alienate the mentally ill defendant, as
opposed to supporting the good of sociability. While one might give credence to the dissent’s
view that personal therapy sessions are individually tailored, the reliance upon community
162
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resources and support, as well as the goal of re-entry (without resort to traditional criminal
punishments) supports the reality that MHATI serves the good of sociability.
In sum, MHATI directly pursues the good of sociability since a court, in making a
diversionary recommendation must consider the impact on the community from which the
mentally ill individual will be diverted.

Objections to this proposition necessarily rest in

Consequentialist thinking or fail to consider the nature of the court’s role handling mentally ill
offenders.
4. MHATI is a Practically Reasonable Practice
MHATI is a practically reasonable legal doctrine because it meets all nine of Finnis’
enumerated requirements. First, the doctrine of MHATI properly fits within a coherent plan of
“life” for the court system. An essential consideration of all rules and laws, not just this doctrine,
is to establish structure for the betterment of the legal system as a whole. MHATI seeks to
organize how courts handle mentally ill offenders, and strengthen the courts’ ability to make the
legal system more predictable, efficient, and clear in accordance with Finnis’ Rule of Law.
Whether the doctrine, in practice, is always properly applied is a separate issue. But, on its face,
the practice serves the whole community. Since the doctrine does not allow for arbitrary
retention or referral of cases, this requirement of practical reasonableness is met.
MHATI also meets the second requirement to not arbitrarily prefer some values over
others. While the primary focus of the doctrine concentrates on knowledge, sociability, life, and
practical reasonableness, such a concentration is not arbitrary. Other goods not directly involved
are not detrimentally affected in any way by the existence of the practice.
With regard to arbitrary preference amongst persons, the doctrine would appear, facially,
to benefit defendants, since the doctrine can be invoked to divert the defendant from the

45

traditional legal system. However, communities also receive a presumptive benefit since the
diverted individual is required to make a conditional plea of guilt before he can participate in the
program. However, the key to this requirement is the term “arbitrary.” The legal system is built
in accordance with a coherent plan of life—to manage disputes where there are violations of the
law. Accordingly, as part of the system, there are communities with harms from offensive
conduct that have the right to seek retribution and mentally ill defendants who, in turn possess
reciprocal but different rights to be treated fairly by the laws163 and practices that have been
developed within American jurisprudence. So, while it may seem that, facially, the doctrine
arbitrarily supports defendants in some fashion, or communities in another, such preferences are
not arbitrary. Rather, the preferences are made in accordance with what Finnis would describe
as the Rule of Law.
Further, considering that anyone in the judicial process can equally request MHATI—
defense lawyers, judges, or even prosecutors—the diversion program is not arrived at arbitrarily,
but instead on the specific circumstances and needs of the community and mentally ill
individual. For the consideration of the community, such a preference is not arbitrary since the
safety of the members of the community is directly implicated if there is recidivism.
Thus the requirement that a court must not make arbitrary preferences amongst persons is
met. Mentally ill offenders in need of treatment are diverted for reasons related to the illness as
well as in consideration of the impact on all parties (the community and the defendant) because
the practice of MHATI promotes all of their particular rights and obligations and matches a
coherent plan of “life” for the legal system.
For the fourth and fifth requirements of practical reasonableness, detachment and
commitment, local courts can demonstrate whether detachment or commitment to a case is
163

See e.g. U.S. Const. amend. VIII (guaranteeing a freedom from cruel and unusual punishments).

46

appropriate by deciding whether or not to divert the offender. Generally, to decide whether to
place a mentally ill defendant, the community has to learn more about the individual through a
psychological screening process. In a narrower sense, the system has to become personally
familiar with the individual to decide if he is an appropriate case for MHATI. Alternatively, if
the system decides to detach from the individual, he will go through the traditional court system.
The actual process of deciding whether MHATI is appropriate is an exercise of determining
whether the case ought to be detached or committed into the system. A community will detach
itself when it finds that the therapeutic system will not be able to appropriately address
recidivism, or commit to the case where it finds that diversion is appropriate for treating the
illness causing the offensive conduct. Accordingly, these two requirements of practical
reasonableness are met by the doctrine.
As discussed above, and with regard to the sixth requirement of practical reasonableness,
MHATI gives a limited but appropriate degree of relevance to consequences.

This is

demonstrated through the balance of community’s and defendant’s needs as the system considers
diversion. In MHCs, defendants receive therapeutic support in the form of not just psychiatric
treatment, but also socialization skills and work readiness.164 Additionally, the programs require
a balancing of the community’s ability to provide the resources to support treatment plans, such
as housing, for the appropriate individuals. Finally, as defendants transition out of the diversion,
the use of exit programs and group sessions illustrates that courts are willing to consider the
direct effects of their decisions, such as a graduate’s job readiness and housing situation once
diversion is completed.
See Queens TASC Mental Health Diversion Program. “Typically, services include intensive
psychiatric monitoring, psychotropic medication, medical coverage, financial support, socialization skills
and work readiness training. In addition, about half of these defendants are in need of housing, thus
requiring placement in residential facilities that provide board and treatment.”
http://www.eacinc.org/queens-tasc-mental-health-diversion-program (April 2, 2014, 5:20 PM).
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These considerations are limited by the financial impact to the community since MHCs
are generally municipality funded. However, barring a complete absence of funds, diversion
programs are not focused on each individual defendant’s personal cost to the program. Instead,
if there are resources available, the system will refer a qualified individual for diversion.
Overall, this refusal to measure each defendant’s economic drain on the diversionary programs,
but instead focus on the resources available relevant to the needs of defendants, demonstrates the
doctrine’s limited relevance of consequences, and therefore the doctrine meets that requirement
of practical reasonableness.
As alluded to previously in this Note, MHATI respects every basic value in its
application. In discussing the above goods served by MHATI, it is clear that concentration falls
on life, knowledge, sociability, and practical reasonableness. Such concentration is far from
arbitrary and no other basic value is in any way directly detrimentally affected. Rather, any good
indirectly negatively affected is not affected simultaneously as the good that is pursued by the
doctrine, thereby defeating the necessity to consider potential double effect. Instead, every good
that may be negatively implicated is both indirect and non-simultaneous. Negative effects may
only occur as an indirect consequence of the application of the doctrine, which is justifiable
under Finnis’ framework. Therefore, this requirement of practical reasonableness is met.
The eight requirement of practical reasonableness is fostering the common good. In the
above discussion on sociability, this requirement is addressed and fully met by the doctrine.165
MHATI directly pursues the good of sociability since a court’s determination to divert must
consider the impact on the community for which the court sits. Objections to this proposition
necessarily rest in Consequentialist thinking or fail to consider the nature of the court’s role in
resolving disputes.
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Lastly, MHATI meets the ninth requirement of practical reasonableness that one follow
one’s conscience. MHCs afford all parties involved broad discretion in determining whether to
recommend diversion. 166 Hence, courts have the authority—because MHATI is flexible and
equitable in nature—to weigh the unique circumstances tied to each case. Unlike particularly
strict laws, which bind a court to particular ruling or course of action, MHATI is flexible,
allowing a human being (the judge) to determine, based on the psychiatric reports, the offensive
conduct, and the needs of the community, whether diversion is necessary. Further, because
defendants must give a conditional guilty plea based on successful completion of the program,
the referring judge can appropriately weigh the facts of the case on his or her conscience.
Accordingly, no judge’s hand is forced if a diversion does not “seem right.”

Thus, this

requirement is met.
In total, based on the nine requirements discussed above, MHATI properly serves
practical reasonableness as it also serves the goods of knowledge and sociability. Therefore,
taking the product of the Finnis’ goods, and through the scope of practical reasonableness,
MHATI is a justifiable practice. The doctrine is moral and applies in accordance with Finnis’
Natural Law framework.
B. Considerations of the Community, Justice, Rights, Authority, and Obligation
From Finnis’ goods and requirements of practical reasonableness, MHATI holds to be
morally justifiable. Still, it is useful to discuss some additional elements of the doctrine in terms
of some of Finnis’ sub-topics within practical reasonableness. Each of these topics will be
addressed in turn below.
With regard to community, this Note has well established that diversion effectively takes
the community into consideration. Courts, in applying MHATI, consider the community in
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which the offenses occurred, as well as the community resources for the diversion, and the
parties involved in the dispute. Further, the doctrine involves the “complete community” since
MHATI primarily operates to prevent recidivism and restore the defendant into the community.
Properly treating the mental illness that contributes to the offensive conduct that harmed the
community and repairing the relationship between defendants and the community to enable entry
enter back into the community thereby contributes to the “complete community.”
In terms of justice, the practice of MHATI does not adjudicate the substantive merits of a
criminal infraction. Whereas participants are required to enter a conditional plea of guilty in
order to work through the diversion program, once the program is complete a judge reviews the
case and dismisses the legal charges or reduces the charge to a lesser offense. 167 A lack of
substantive determination, however, does not mean that justice is not implicated by the doctrine.
Rather, the discretion and authority exercised by supervising judges demonstrates the practice’s
applicability to commutative justice. Judges, in presiding over a MHATI case, must reach a fair
and equitable solution based on the needs of the defendant and the community. This proper
management of disputes serves as commutative justice for the parties involved as well the
broader communities discussed above. As for distributive justice, the overall concern for the
impact to the community demonstrates the proportionate concern for everyone involved in the
dispute. The parties to the offense, having the most at stake, are afforded the largest voices.
However, the surrounding community is considered for purposes of resources, entry and exit
plans, as well as other burdens imposed. The fact that each relevant member of every one of the
court’s community receives some proportionate degree of consideration and weight in the
analysis illustrates that MHATI serves distributive justice as well.
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Strongly connected to justice, the doctrine properly respects several elemental human
rights. For instance, the right to information and the right to be heard are directly involved in a
MHATI determination. The underlying purpose of the doctrine is to foster decisions by all the
appropriate parties and to divert mentally ill individuals into programs that are appropriate
treatment, based on their offensive conduct and mental illness. Accordingly, when deciding the
referral, courts are deciding whether the defendant meets the psychological criteria and whether
the needs of the community would be better served by therapeutic measures as opposed to
punitive. While a harmed community criminally has a right to seek retribution, the mentally ill
defendant has a reciprocal right to be punished in a manner that does not penalize him for his
mental impairment. Ultimately, every party is heard and the most information is extracted in the
process.
Further, MHATI comports with Finnis’ defined Rule of Law. The practice is coherent,
sufficiently stable as to allow persons to be directed by its guidelines, and effectuated by
accountable and consistent judges—officials bound by stare decisis and appellate courts.
Additionally, although there are nuanced issues surrounding the practice, (such as whether
everyone with mental illness should be diverted or only certain qualified candidates), on the
whole the procedure is quite clear. Interested parties recommending or requesting diversion
understand MHATI and frequently bring their requests for the appropriate individuals for the
benefit of both the offemder and the community equally. Overall, MHATI comports with the
Rule of Law. Therefore, the doctrine is practically reasonable in this sense.
Lastly, with the justifiable nature of MHATI clearly established, the last element of
Finnis’ framework that relevantly applies is obligation.

Here, municipalities and varying

jurisdictions have undertaken their legal obligations to address the needs of the mentally ill
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offender in the population. Further, courts have fulfilled their commutative justice obligations
by developing the doctrine with Finnis’ goods and practical reasonableness in mind. As the
DOJ, the American Psychiatric Association, and the National Commission of Correctional
Health Care studies discussed, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, there were burdens
and issues surrounding the overcrowding of mentally ill offenders in prison.168 In fulfillment of
its obligation to establish humane laws, municipalities with the bi-partisan support of the
government,169 established therapeutic courts and diversion programs. Now, with the practice
established, judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys and other interested partiese within the
community exercise similar obligations in properly requesting and relying on MHATI as the
community has bound them to use.
Ultimately, in consideration of all of Finnis’ goods, requirements of practical
reasonableness, and considerations of sub-topics with those requirements, MHATI stands as a
morally justifiable doctrine.
V.

CONCLUSION

Despite fluctuating awareness for mental illness in the judicial system, MHATI has
developed as a substantially useful practice tailored to support the needs of the mentally ill
offenders as well as the community. Though the needs of mentally ill individuals has been
challenged through the years, pioneers such as Dorothea Dix have contributed to the proper
attention to this portion of the population. Deinstitutionalization contributed to a near epidemic
overloading the prison system with mentally ill offenders. Concomitant with the balloon theory,
however, as awareness grew and advocates such as Judge Lipman charged the bar to rise to the
problem, MHCs began to gain in popularity and implementation. Though “[p]revention and
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incapacitation are often legitimate goals,” MHATI stands for the proposition that it is essential
“to bridge the gap between proper skepticism about rehabilitation on the one hand and the
improper refusal to acknowledge that the more than two million inmates in the United States are
human beings whose minds and spirits we must try to reach.”170
The doctrine of diversion is firmly established on Finnis’ natural law framework for
morality. Specifically, MHATI properly addresses Finnis’ goods of knowledge, sociability, and
practical reasonableness. Further, the doctrine has been developed with the common good and
commutative justice in consideration. Accordingly, because MHATI meets Finnis’ framework
for moral justifiability, MHATI stands as good law, in both the moral and legal senses.
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